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DrivingUptheCost
of Clean Air
T
he internal
combustion
engine is a mixed
blessing. The free-
dom of movement
provided by cars and
light trucks—minivans,
SUVs, and pickups—is
unprecedented. But these same vehicles
also pose a major public health problem. It is not surpris-
ing, then, that strategies to mitigate the harmful side effects
of personal transportation are a major topic of study. 
In 2002, car accidents killed nearly 43,000 and inca-
pacitated another 356,000, according to the National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration. Vehicle exhaust
contributes to untold numbers of hospitalizations for
asthma attacks and other health problems, while car-related
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heart attacks. Cars and light trucks on
American roads contribute slightly less
than 4% of the world’s annual burden of
greenhouse gases and about 20% of the
U.S. burden. Each year, car- and truck-
related congestion costs the United States
$63 billion in lost time and wasted fuel,
according to the Texas Transportation
Institute’s 2004 Urban Mobility Report,
and 5.6 billion gallons of gasoline are
wasted by idling in traffic. 
Much controversy swirls in the debate
over how best to mitigate the harmful side
effects of automotive transportation. It is
somewhat helpful to sharpen the debate
by appealing to economic theory,
although ideals usually become badly
dented when they collide with politics. 
Some of these harmful side effects are
what economists call “externalities,” or
costs that are not incorporated into the
market price. A motorist buying gasoline,
for example, does not pay for the costs of
the climate change or the air pollution
that will result from burning that fuel, or
the military cost of maintaining access to
Persian Gulf oil. 
Externalities have obvious solutions:
figure out their costs, and incorporate
them into the price. The theoretically
superior strategy would be to tax individ-
ual greenhouse gas emissions and to incor-
porate defense costs into the price of oil
specifically from the Persian Gulf
(although military spending, generally
viewed as a fixed rather than variable cost,
is usually excluded from computations of
the optimal oil or gasoline tax). 
Accidents are arguably not externali-
ties, because they are largely paid for
through insurance. However, car insurance
does not cover expenses such as fire and
police department costs or costs related to
death and pain/suffering. Furthermore,
insurance is a lump-sum payment rather
than a per-mile charge, so motorists likely
do not consider accident costs when
deciding how much to drive a given vehi-
cle. Traffic congestion, a well-established
result of motorization, is less ambiguous as
an externality, although people endure
part of the delays they help to create. But
to the extent that accidents and conges-
tion are externalities, they are externalities
of driving, not of gasoline use, because
cars can run on other fuels. 
As yet, determining the cost of fuel-
based externalities is a primitive art, says
Mark Delucchi, a research scientist at the
Institute for Transportation Studies of the
University of California, Davis. “The best
estimates of virtually all important external
costs—air pollution, noise, accidents, con-
gestion, and oil importing—vary by about
an order of magnitude,” he wrote in the
spring 2000 issue of Access magazine.
Delucchi advocates using these estimates to
inform but not determine policy.
A number of strategies have been sug-
gested in the United States to reduce the
problems created by automotive trans-
portation. One strategy in particular—the
corporate average fuel economy (CAFE)
standards—has been around for several
decades. The pros and cons of personal
transportation and the controversy sur-
rounding CAFE and other strategies
demonstrate the need for careful thought—
as well as the hazards that arise—when pol-
icy meets politics.
High-Test CAFE 
The legislation authorizing CAFE was
enacted in 1975, following the 1973–
1974 Arab oil embargo. CAFE standards
set an average gas mileage requirement for a
manufacturer’s fleet. The fuel economy of
all the cars sold by a manufacturer in any
given year must average 27.5 miles per gal-
lon, and the fuel economy of all light trucks
sold must average 20.7 miles per gallon. So
Ford Motor Company, for example, must
sell a lot of its diminutive Focuses to make
up for the portly Lincolns, and the relative-
ly small Ford Escapes must make up for the
Lincoln Navigators, Ford Excursions, and
other SUVs. 
The goal of CAFE was to double new
car fuel economy with no loss in perfor-
mance, a goal that was largely achieved by
1985, according to the 2002 National
Academy of Sciences (NAS) report Effec-
tiveness and Impact of Corporate Average
Fuel Economy (CAFE) Standards. The same
might have been accomplished with a tax,
but a cartel—or monopoly—is not an exter-
nality, and applying a tax on top of monop-
oly pricing could damage the economy.
Arguably, there was no ideal solution.
CAFE is also credited with helping in
1986 to collapse prices set by the
Organization of the Petroleum Exporting
Countries, bringing gasoline prices down
from an inflation-adjusted peak of
$2.94/gallon in 1981. According to the
NAS report, without CAFE, the United
States would be burning an additional 2.8
million barrels per day—equivalent to about
14% of current U.S. consumption and 3%
of world consumption—at a cost of $120
billion dollars annually (about 19% of the
U.S. goods and services deficit for 2004).
But not everyone agrees that CAFE
has been that effective at curbing fuel con-
sumption. In the May 1997 issue of the
Journal of Regulatory Economics, materials
scientist Steven Thorpe wrote that CAFE
standards may actually have contributed
to a decline in the average fuel economy
of the new fleet by shifting sales to less
fuel-efficient vans, trucks, and SUVs. 
CAFE opponents—such as Tom
Walton, director of economic policy at
General Motors—argue more generally
that the cost of CAFE is greater than the
benefits. A 9 March 2004 issue brief by
the Congressional Budget Office (CBO)
found that “[u]nless current estimates of
the benefits of reducing gasoline con-
sumption are significantly understated,
increasing CAFE standards would not pass
a benefit–cost test.” 
Many opponents say that in the
absence of higher gasoline prices, improved
fuel economy encourages people to drive
an extra 10–20% (however, according to
David Greene, an environmental engineer
at Oak Ridge National Laboratory, a 10%
increase in fuel economy will result in only
about a 1% increase in driving). Oppo-
nents further argue that the additional
accidents and congestion caused by this
surplus driving cost roughly $1.00 and
$1.40 per gallon, respectively, at current
average U.S. fleet fuel economy. These
costs subsume the benefits of greater fuel
economy, a combined savings on green-
house gas effects and oil dependency of
30¢ per gallon, and on pollution of an
additional 40¢ per gallon at current fleet
average fuel economy. 
However, Roland Hwang, vehicles poli-
cy director for the Natural Resources
Defense Council, says that these arguments
fail to acknowledge that fuel economy can
be raised while saving consumers money.
“There are private benefits to raising fuel
economy—benefits which the market has
not organized to capture,” he says. He
points to the Energy Star labels and effi-
ciency standards created for the appliance
market by the government as an example of
how to attach a social responsibility value
to a product—a value that many con-
sumers prize and thus will pay more for.
Furthermore, says Hwang, the benefits
of CAFE are understated. Standards send
a strong signal to manufacturers to orga-
nize research, which frequently pushes
down the cost of incorporating advanced
technologies into new models, he
explains. For example, California’s strin-
gent emissions standards led to car com-
panies’ discovery that instead of using an
expensive electrically heated exhaust-
cleaning catalyst, they could move the cat-
alyst close enough to the engine for the
latter to heat it, without damaging the
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stantial economic savings. 
Althought the 2002 NAS report failed
to endorse CAFE, it did describe a poten-
tial modification that might be more
attractive—manufacturers would receive
fuel economy credits for exceeding the
target fleet average, and instead of meet-
ing the target, they could buy credits from
other manufacturers or the government.
The prospect of selling extra credits might
motivate manufacturers to boost fuel
economy beyond the target—although
Ian Parry, a senior fellow at Resources for
the Future, notes this would be offset by
other manufacturers buying credits so
their fuel economy could be lower than
the standard. 
A carbon cap-and-trade system, also
favorably described by the NAS, could
extend this type of system to other fossil
fuel uses as a means of reducing green-
house gas emissions. In this scenario, the
government would set a mandatory cap
on total emissions, and distribute emis-
sions rights to sellers and users, which
they could trade among themselves.
Other Measures
While CAFE has been a continuing
source of controversy, the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) Tier I regula-
tions for tailpipe emissions have reduced
emissions by about 90% since the 1970s,
according to the Union of Concerned
Scientists. However, automotive pollution
remains a local problem in some regions,
says John Millett, a spokesman for the
EPA. Diesel pollution also is still a prob-
lem and will remain so for many years,
says Delucchi. 
The regulation strategy incorporates a
political decision to protect the most vul-
nerable, rather than just the average per-
son, says Hwang. The new Tier 2 regula-
tions finalized in 1999 and the retirement
of most Tier 1 automobiles by around
2030 will be the equivalent, in terms of air
quality improvement, of removing 164 mil-
lion cars from the road. These standards
will add about $100 and $200 to the pur-
chase price of cars and light trucks, respec-
tively. Additionally, the removal of sulfur
from gasoline adds about 2¢ per gallon at
the pump.
The EPA estimates, however, that the
health and environmental benefits will
ultimately be worth $25.2 billion annually,
at a cost to industry of $5.3 billion. The
Tier 2 standards will prevent as many as
4,300 deaths, more than 10,000 cases of
chronic and acute bronchitis, and tens of
thousands of respiratory problems per year,
the EPA estimated in its 1999 announce-
ment of the standards. 
A gasoline tax represents another strate-
gy. In theory, a gas tax can function as a car-
bon tax and therefore may be appropriate
for addressing the fuel-related externality of
carbon dioxide emissions and the resulting
climate change. But carbon dioxide is not
the only vehicle emission to affect climate,
and using a gasoline tax to reduce personal
vehicles’ contribution to greenhouse gases
could be considered wasteful, because coal-
fired utilities’ contributions dwarf those of
cars and trucks. In addition, a gas tax is of
little use against congestion, because it does-
n’t differentiate between rush hour city
miles and non–rush hour or rural driving. A
better method would be to tax the carbon
content of all fossil fuels. 
So-called feebates, endorsed by the
NAS report, would provide a rebate to
buyers of cars and trucks that exceed a fuel
economy benchmark, and charge a fee to
buyers of cars that miss the benchmark.
(The federal “gas guzzler” tax represents
such a fee, but lacks the complementary
carrot.) Researchers at Rocky Mountain
Institute (RMI) in Snowmass, Colorado,
have proposed a program in which the
benchmark would be reset every year to
keep it revenue-neutral. The program
would be size-neutral and would make
money for automakers as well as con-
sumers. “Unlike standards, feebates reward
and propel continuous improvement,”
according to the RMI report Winning the
Oil Endgame.
RMI proposes complementing fee-
bates with a scrap-and-replace program
for low-income households, which would
get what are traditionally the least effi-
cient cars off the road, and provide poorer
families with reliable, affordable personal
transportation. “There is a growing con-
sensus that limited mobility is an impor-
tant missing link in a comprehensive
strategy for reducing poverty,” according
to Winning the Oil Endgame. One of two
proposed mechanisms would finance
highly efficient new cars through high-
volume procurement and lease them to
qualified low-income citizens. The corre-
sponding scrappage of clunkers could start
with the dirtiest cars.
Two other novel proposals still in the
experimental stages—pay-as-you-drive
(PAYD) and pay-at-the-pump (PATP)—
tackle the issue from the insurance point
of view. These strategies lack the poison-
ous aura of a tax because they would
merely shift the way people make their car
insurance payments without adding to the
cost of driving. 
By making insurance payments directly
proportional to vehicle miles traveled,
PAYD would act like a gas tax in boosting
the motivation to reduce driving, especially
for high-risk drivers. “[PAYD] insurance
conveys to drivers the true costs they impose
on others, and allows motorists . . . to save
money by reducing these costs,” states the
Online TDM [transportation demand man-
agement] Encyclopedia published by Can-
ada’s Victoria Transport Policy Institute.
“Vehicle crashes should decline even more
than mileage because higher-risk motorists
(who currently pay high premiums per vehi-
cle-year) would pay higher per-mile fees,
and would therefore have the greatest incen-
tive to reduce their driving.” 
The result could be to save an estimat-
ed 5,000 lives that would have been lost
to crashes involving reckless drivers,
according to the encyclopedia. Yet, the
cost of driving would fall, on average, by
$50–100 per vehicle. 
Parry cautions that it would take time
for insurance companies to adopt PAYD,
and he advocates a tax credit for insurance
companies to kick-start the market. But
PAYD is no panacea. Parry, a proponent,
foresees a need for separate congestion
charges, which he thinks might completely
replace gasoline taxes several decades hence. 
PATP, on the other hand, trades
PAYD’s incentive to drive less for an incen-
tive to drive less, buy a more fuel-efficient
car, or both. A basic insurance fee would be
charged at the gas pump, and motorists
could buy more comprehensive coverage or
pay for higher-risk coverage directly from
the insurance companies. 
The Best Deal
Ideally, policies should “deal directly with a
problem, not indirectly,” says David O.
Dapice, an economics professor from Tufts
University. He suggests that a gasoline tax is
no better than a Swiss army knife for deal-
ing with safety, congestion, and air pollu-
tion. “If you are worried about congestion,
tax congestion,” he says. “If you are worried
about safety, set standards, or require tech-
nologies that promote safety, such as
rollover standards for SUVs. If you want to
deal with carbon dioxide, tax carbon.” But,
he adds, “If you want to save fuel, tax fuel.” 
As the controversy continues over how
best to mitigate the harmful side effects of
automobiles, one thing becomes abundantly
clear: cars aren’t going away anytime soon,
and the more we can reduce their impact on
our environment and our health, the better
it will be for all humankind. 
David C. Holzman
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